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 Aristotle has, on the whole, a comfortably modern theory of truth. For 
example, we read in de Interpretatione (17a2) and again in de Anima (430a27) that 
truth cannot belong to anything less than a statement—not to a single word or 
idea, not to just any string of words. Moreover, we read in Book VI of the 
Metaphysics (1027b26ff) that truth belongs to statements and beliefs, but not to 
the things that those statements and beliefs are about. We may at first be a bit 
alarmed to read that truth is, for Aristotle, a kind of being;  but it really just comes 
to this, that the unqualified verb 'to be' in Greek can mean 'to be true'—; 
moreover, says Aristotle, it is a relatively minor meaning of the verb 'to be', a 
sideline (1027b30ff). All of this seems sensible and right. 
 This picture is troubled, though, by Metaphysics IX,10. This chapter clearly 
ascribes truth and falsity not just to thoughts and statements, but also to the 
things (ta pragmata) those thoughts and statements are about; it also ascribes 
truth to incomposites and to the things they designate. Moreover, it says that 
being in the sense of truth is the most important kind of being: being in the 
strictest sense: to kyriôtata on.1 The mismatch with the other writings on truth is 
very striking. 
 Commentators have been much irked by this chapter. Ross, for example, 
says that Aristotle's linguistic carelessness has made his meaning more obscure 
than it really is (Ross, 1970, 278).  He then performs sanitizing surgery: he simply 
brackets the claim that being in the sense of truth is the most important kind of 
being (to kyriôtata on) from his edition of the Greek text and drops it from his 
translation.2  Giovanni Reale (1968, 92n2) followed Ross in his Italian version. 
Werner Jaeger in the critical apparatus to his edition of the text suggests solving 
the problem not by deletion but by addition (Jaeger, 1963, ad loc.).  Some 
commentators perform on this chapter what I like to call the exegetical glissando, 
that is a careful study of a string of fussy little matters without even alluding to the 
major problem that the chapter presents. Pseudo-Alexander is the most striking 
example here (Alexander, 1891, ad loc.).  Felix Grayeff concluded that this chapter 
is not the work of Aristotle himself, but of some other member of the Lyceum, less 
clear-headed than his master (Grayeff, 1974, 207n.).  And Jaeger is so embarrassed 
by what seem like Platonizing parts of this chapter that he offers this diagnosis:  
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Aristotle went over his Metaphysics late in his life when he had drifted back 
towards a more Platonic position; he altered things here and there to make the 
Metaphysics exhibit 'a gradual ascent up the scale of being to immaterial essence, 
and to make the whole work single in its aim, though constructed of such 
disparate materials' (Jaeger, 1960, 205). IX,10 was added as part of this exercise. To 
be honest, I find this incredible.  
 
 Let us, then, consider this chapter. It presents, as I see it, three problems to 
the modern reader. The text ascribes truth and falsity not only to beliefs and 
statements but also to the things, the objects that these beliefs and statements 
designate. And this distinction is later cross-divided with that between composites 
and incomposites (whatever those are). Thus truth and falsity are ascribed to four 
sorts of entities:  (a) composite designators, (b) composite designata, (c) 
incomposite designators, and (d) incomposite designata. Only the first of these 
cases seems to make any sense. But (b) what does it mean to say that designata of 
statements or beliefs are true or false?  A true fact is a pleonasm; there is nothing 
for facts to be true to. Further (c) how can a single word or a single incomposite 
idea be said to be true? And finally, (d) how can the designatum of a single word 
or incomposite idea be said to be true? In this paper I shall consider only the first 
of these three problems, though what I propose here can function as a 
springboard for attempting the remaining two. What, then, does Aristotle mean by 
ascribing truth and falsity to composite things? 
 The examples that Aristotle gives of composites are white stick and 
incommensurable diagonal.3 And he writes that being and nonbeing in the sense 
of truth or falsity 
...in the case of the things is a matter of being combined or separated, so 
that he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be 
combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to 
that of the objects is in falsity (1051b2-5). 
The second part of this passage gives a rough correspondence theory of the truth 
of beliefs, but the first part seems to say that the things themselves are true if their 
elements are combined, and false if their elements are separate. I have read in a 
'respectively' here, but it would seem to be amply justified by a later passage in the 
chapter: 
Being, in the sense of truth, and nonbeing, in the sense of falsity in the one 
case (sc. composites) come to this:  if (the elements are) combined, it is true;  
if they are not combined, it is false (1051b33-35). 
So, things are true, or are in the sense of truth, if their parts are combined;  false if 
their elements are separated. What does this mean? 
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 Apart from the various ways of writing off this chapter that I mentioned, 
there have, I think, been three honest attempts to understand it, or rather this part 
of it, fathered respectively by Aquinas, Brentano and Heidegger. I would like 
consider these before I go on to make a further proposal. I begin with Brentano. 
 
 (i) Brentano's turning the tables. Brentano's principal answer to the question 
what is meant by ascribing truth and falsity to things consists in changing the 
direction of the truth relation. Just as statements can be true or false to the things 
they are about, so things can be true or false to the statements that are made 
about them. He writes: 
...how is it that a thing can be called true or false?  Obviously only in so far 
as it forms the object of a true or a false judgment. Thus things are called 
true or false with respect to our judgment.... (Brentano, 1975, 21) 
 
 It is true, I think, that we do very occasionally speak of things being true to 
judgments, though usually only when the judgment antedates the thing, when the 
judgment is a forecast. 'His subsequent career was true to my prediction', we 
might say. Notice a peculiarity of this usage, though. When we say that a judgment 
is true, we don't have to go on and say to what it is true, to which fact or thing. But 
when, with Brentano, we say that a fact or thing is true, we have to specify to what 
judgment it is true. For any fact is true to one judgment and false to another—its 
contradictory—, whereas a judgment is true or false to only one fact. All this, 
however, is surely an obscure back street of metaphysics, resting on a rare and 
awkward façon de parler. It would be odd to make much of it, and quixotic to see 
in it the principal kind of being. 
 And in any case, it cannot possibly be what Aristotle has in mind. On 
Brentano's account truth and falsity in things is a relational property;  it consists in 
a relation between a thing and a judgment. But it is clear that Aristotle's notion of 
truth in things is that it is a nonrelational property. A composite thing is true if its 
elements are combined and false if its elements are separated. So Brentano cannot 
be right. 
 
 (ii) Aquinas' veritas ontological causalis. Aquinas fathered a long tradition 
concerning the relation between beliefs and facts. This tradition distinguishes 
veritas logica, the familiar kind of truth that belongs to beliefs and statements, 
from veritas ontologica, which belongs to the states of affairs and things that 
beliefs and statements designate. More particularly, the truth of things is veritas 
ontologica causalis: states of affairs have ontological truth when they cause true 
beliefs about themselves in the mind (Aquinas, 1950, ad loc.).  So we might say 
that ontological truth is called truth by a figure of speech—a form of metonymy—
 4 
in which the cause bears a predicate which properly applies to its effect:  the cause 
is named by its effect. Properly, it is the belief, the effect, that is true;  but by 
metonymy we call its cause, the fact or thing, true as well. 
 This is a clever idea, and maybe it was what Aristotle had in mind. But it 
encounters a major problem. Any given fact will be the cause of a corresponding 
truth: the fact that the cat is on the mat is the cause of the truth of "the cat is on 
the mat". But any such fact is also the cause of a corresponding falsehood: the fact 
that the cat is on the mat is the cause of the falsity of "the cat is not on the mat". 
So there is just as much reason to call any fact an ontological falsehood as there is 
to call it an ontological truth. The device errs by liberalism 
 
 (iii) Heidegger's unconcealedness. The text of IX,10 was of crucial 
importance to Heidegger in his influential analysis of the Greek concept of truth. 
He examined the etymology of alêtheia, and found it to be made up of the 
negative prefix a-  and a word which comes from lanthanô, to escape notice. That 
which is true, then, is that which does not escape notice, that which is 
unconcealed, dis-covered (Heidegger, 1962, H225).  It follows that the primary 
locus for truth is not beliefs and propositions, but things, not designators but 
designata. Hence the importance of IX,10 to his view. 
 Famously, though, Charles Kahn argued that though Heidegger was right 
about the root he was wrong about the voice. The alêthês is not unconcealed but 
unconcealing (Kahn, 1973, 363ff).  The evidence is the meaning of alêthês in the 
Homeric texts where, presumably, the earlier and deeper semantic strata are more 
patent. In those texts Kahn finds that alêthês is never used of either beliefs or 
things, but only of persons, and it means 'undeceiving', 'sincere', 'truthful'. These 
studies were pursued and these conclusions broadly confirmed by J.-P. Levet 
(1976).   So the primitive idea of unconcealedness, which Heidegger finds in the 
early use of alêtheia cannot be what Aristotle is thinking of in ascribing truth and 
falsity to things. 
 
 (iv) A further proposal. For composites, having their ontological elements 
combined, is at one point called by Aristotle truth (1051b2); later it is called being 
(1051b18); and later it is called being in the sense of truth (1051b33). And the 
property of having ontological elements separated is called falsity, nonbeing, and 
nonbeing in the sense of falsity. This should lead us to suspect that truth, for 
things, is pretty much what we would call existence.4 It has always seemed very 
puzzling that, with his frequent refrain about the many senses of being, Aristotle 
never seems to notice the one sense that we would think primordial — the 
existential sense. If this is right, if being in the sense of truth as it belongs to 
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designata is simply existence, then it is particularly appropriate that this should be 
called the principal sense of being. 
 We must ask, though, (a) what exactly these composites are, and (b) why it 
would make sense for Aristotle to use the language of truth to express existence. 
 (a) What exactly are the composites? A prima facie objection to my proposal 
to find a general theory of existence in this chapter is that the composites that 
Aristotle is discussing, at least if we are to be guided by his examples, are not 
things in the ordinary sense, but states of affairs: the stick's being white and the 
diagonal's being incommensurable. To answer this objection I have to argue that 
Aristotle has in mind much more than states of affairs when he speaks of 
composites.5 
 We can advance the search for the nature of composites by asking what 
Aristotle means by incomposites. We might have supposed that when he came to 
discuss incomposites in the second part of the chapter (starting at 1051b16) we 
would find that they were simply the elements of which our earlier composites 
were made: stick, white, diagonal, incommensurable. Unfortunately the text of this 
part is more than usually crabbed and telegraphic, and its meaning is not very 
clear. What is clear, however, is that he is talking about some fairly lofty sorts of 
things. These incomposites are all said to exist not potentially but in actuality 
(1051b28), no error is possible about them — only ignorance (1051b27) —, they 
appear to be called 'being itself' (1051b29). Surely Aristotle is not here talking 
about anything so humble as a stick! 
 An important clue to understanding what is going on here is Aristotle's 
mention of incomposite substances (tas mê synthetas ousias 1051b27). This 
implies that there are also composite substances. Of course this is not news: 
individuals are composites of matter and form; essences are composites of genus 
and differentia, etc. But it suggests that Aristotle is here considering what happens 
when one reaches the limits of discomposition.6 That is, Aristotle in his discussion 
of composites was giving us a general recipe for understanding the existence of 
anything which can be discomposed: existence consists in the combination of the 
ontological parts. (Recall the analysis of 'a threshold exists' as 'a stone is placed in 
such-and-such a way', and other such examples, in Metaphysics VIII, 2.) The section 
of the chapter dealing with incomposites, then, is dealing with absolute 
incomposites, things which cannot be discomposed. And composites are 
everything else, including ordinary things like sticks and diagonals; they exist by 
having their parts combined.7 
 
 (b) From truth to existence.  But why should Aristotle have called existence 
truth?  How are these notions allied for him?  They are not so allied for us. 
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 Let me first say what the answer is not. It is a commonplace that the 
unqualified verb 'to be' in Greek has a veridical use:  tauta esti—these things are—
is the constant refrain of Socrates' interlocutors. So the verb 'to be' can be used to 
ascribe truth in Greek. That fact will explain why the language of being can be used 
to predicate truth, but it doesn't explain why the language of truth can be used to 
predicate being, existence. Language about feet in the Bible, we are told, is often 
used euphemistically to designate genital organs, but we do not infer that if sexual 
organs were mentioned they would be a euphemism for feet. What makes it apt 
for Aristotle to see existence as a kind of truth? 
 The answer I want to defend is that what Aristotle means by the truth of 
things is what we might call their reality,8 and of course it is not so hard at first 
glance to understand how that should be regarded as meaning their existence.  
 First the positive evidence. alêthês in Greek can mean 'real'. Euripides, for 
example, in the Orestes (414) speaks of a 'real friend'.  
 Against this proposal several objections will be urged. In the first place, the 
normal Greek word for 'real' or 'genuine' is alêthinos, not alêthês. Secondly, and 
more forcefully, a real friend, a true friend, is not exactly an existent friend, but one 
who is no sham:  reality in its normal sense seems not at all the same as existence. 
An unreal friend, a fairweather friend, nonetheless exists.  
 Let us take these objections in turn. First, alêthinos and alêthês. If we may 
trust the dictionary, the only difference between these two is that alêthinos cannot 
be used of words, but alêthês can. Both can be used of people, meaning truthful, 
or of things, meaning real.  
 The second objection was that existence and reality are not the same thing. 
'Real' is a word whose use is heavily dependent on the pragmatics of language:  
we only call a thing real to rule out the suggestion or suspicion that it is 'sham, 
half-baked, makeshift...'  Austin has located the concept of reality firmly in the 
terrain of plastic flowers, toy buses, real eccentrics and genuine cowhide (Austin, 
1970). Surely, however, this is too swift. One of the meanings of reality, though 
perhaps not the commonest, is existence. Is Santa Claus real?  
 Moreover, Aristotle was clearly aware that existence was only one, and a 
rather special, meaning of alêthês. Or at least he was aware that non-existence was 
only one meaning of pseudês. In ∆29, the chapter on falsity, pseudos, he says that 
pseudos can belong to things (pragmata)  in two senses: meaning that the thing in 
question does not exist because its elements are separated (1034b22), or else that 
the thing, though it does exist, is such as not to seem like what it is. The latter is 
exactly the case of plastic flowers. So Aristotle recognizes, explicitly, two senses of 
'real', one in which it means existent and amounts to having its elements 
combined, and the other in which it means genuine.9 And we have seen that, pace 
Austin, both of these senses occur also in English.  
 7 
 But what is the connection between truth and reality? Alêthês means 'true', 
but it also means 'real', and one sense of 'real' is 'existing'. All of this is obscured in 
English because, although 'true' can mean real in the sense of 'genuine' (True 
Cross, true megalomaniac etc.), it cannot ever mean real in the sense of 'existing'. 
The English words do not map onto the Greek, and that, I believe, is the simple 
source of the discomfort we feel in reading this chapter:  
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NOTES 
 
  
1 There has been debate about whether the adverb kyriôtata should be taken with 
on (Burnyeat et al., 1984, p. 256) or with alêthes (Crivelli, 2004, p. 236). The latter 
view would lessen the tension with VI, 4, but it seems to me grammatically 
impossible. See the discussion in Long, 2011, p. 172, n.45. 
 
2 Jonathan Barnes restored the phrase in his revision of the Oxford translation. 
 
3  The text reads:  hôsper to leukon <to> xylon ê to asummetron tên diametron.  
The <to> was supplied by Bywater, presumably to give parity of grammatical 
structure to the mention of the two examples. I am not sure that it is called for. 
Aristotle in this section makes much of the distinction between accidental 
predication — sometimes so and sometimes not so — and essential predication — 
always so and impossible to be otherwise.  The examples are, I suppose, meant to 
pick up this distinction. The first to in each case is presumably the to of mention; 
the article tên with diametron may be there to show that it is diameters in general 
that are being talked about; i.e. it may be the universalizing definite article. This 
would underline the point that incommensurability is a property not just of this or 
that diagonal, but of all diagonals, of diagonals in general. If that is the force of the 
definite article, then we neither need nor want one in the case of a white stick.  It is 
not the universal stick that is white. 
 
4  This view was suggested by Halper, 1989, p. 219. 
 
5 Crivelli (2004, p. 6) suggests that Aristotle's composites fall into two classes, 
states of affairs and material substances. He claims that all states of affairs, true 
and false, exist; truth is, for them, a further property. I have difficulty making sense 
of this. 
 
6 In de Anima III, 6, which treats of the knowledge of simples, Aristotle 
distinguishes things which are potentially simple from things which are actually 
simple (430b6ff). Although his example there has to do with quantitative simplicity, 
the point is the same:  some things which are actually compound can be treated as 
simples; others are simple in themselves. 
 
7 What kind of existence is in play? Kahn's subtle work on the verb 'be' in Greek 
has isolated three different uses of the verb which might be called existential (as 
well as a number of others which might be confused with existential uses: veridical, 
 9 
  
locative, etc). These existential uses are (1) the existential copula:  'There is a certain 
Socrates, a wise man, a student of things aloft ... who makes the weaker argument 
the stronger';  (2) the existential sentence operator: 'There is someone (no one) 
who does such-and-such';  (3) the existential predicate: 'There are no gods'. Kahn 
sees (3) as growing out of (2), which in turn grows out of (1). The existential verb 
'to be' stems thus from the copula (Kahn, 1986, 9-12). 
 
In claiming that Aristotle in IX,10 of the Metaphysics is flagging an existential sense 
or use of the verb 'to be', I have in mind the last and strongest case: a flat claim 
that so-and-so is part of the furniture of the world—a claim that something or 
other is indeed there to be met with.  
 
8  Kahn suggests that truth and reality are the direction in which to look for the 
emergence of the concept of existence in Greek philosophy. See Kahn, 1976. 
 
9 Absent from IX,10 is any notion of truth (reality) as genuineness. 
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